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Stock Options and Credit Default Swaps in Risk 
Management  
 
1 ABSTRACT 
 
The use of stock options and credit default swaps (CDS) in banks is not uncommon. Stock 
options can induce risk-taking incentives, while CDS can be used to hedge against credit risk. 
Building on the existing literature on executive compensation and risk management, our study 
contributes novel empirical support for the role of stock options in restraining the use of CDS 
for hedging purposes. Based on data of CEO stock options and CDS held by 60 European banks 
during the period 2006-2011, we find a negative relationship between option-induced risk-
taking incentives (vega) and the proportion of CDS held for hedging. However, the extent of 
CDS held for hedging is found to be positively related to default risk in the period leading to 
the financial crisis that erupted in 2007. The findings imply that restraining the use of stock 
options can incentivize hedging with CDS, but this risk management strategy will not 
necessarily produce lower default risk in times of systemic credit crisis. 
 
Key words: Stock Options; Credit Default Swaps; Risk Management; Vega; Bank Risk-
taking; Credit Crisis 
JEL classification: G21, G32, J33  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Studies on corporate risk management and derivatives use commonly view derivatives as 
hedging instruments (e.g., Smith and Stulz, 1985; Rogers, 2002; Aretz and Bartram, 2010). 
The role of credit derivatives as credit risk management instruments in banks is widely 
acknowledged (e.g., Hirtle, 2009; Nijskens and Wagner, 2011). Banks have dominated the 
credit derivatives market, in which CDS are the most commonly used credit derivatives 
globally (British Bankers’ Association (BBA), 2006; Minton et al., 2009; International Swaps 
and Derivatives Association (ISDA), 2010). However, the incentives underlying the use of 
CDS and the effectiveness of such credit risk management remain unknown (Minton et al., 
2009). Our study contributes to filling this gap.  
CDS allow the transfer of credit risk across firms, whereby buying CDS allows a bank to 
short exposure to credit risk at a known cost (i.e., insurance premium). From the buyer’s 
perspective, the economic effect of a CDS contract is similar to that of an insurance contract, 
because it protects the buyer against the default of the underlying asset during the life of the 
contract (Duffee and Zhou, 2001). This protection is important for banks that are constantly 
exposed to the credit or default risks of risky assets (e.g., loans and mortgages). We can expect 
that banks with hedging motives or those managed by risk-averse managers are more likely to 
buy CDS that transfer the credit risks of risky assets to the sellers of such derivatives. 
However, bank managers are not always risk-averse, because their risk-taking appetites 
would enhance when stock options are included in their pay packages. Studies on executive 
compensation suggest that equity-based pay, such as stock options, had induced risk-taking 
behaviours among bank managers in the build-up of the 2007-2008 crisis (e.g., Bebchuk et al., 
2010; Fortin et al., 2010; Minhat and Abdullah, 2016). Some studies also suggest that stock 
options can discourage managers from hedging risk (e.g., Smith and Stulz, 1985; Tufano, 1996; 
Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; Aretz and Bartram, 2010; Bakke et al., 2016). This is because 
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stock options contain an important feature that can induce, rather than restrain, managers’ risk-
taking appetites. This feature is described as vega, which measures the extent of risk-taking 
incentives induced by stock options (Guay, 1999; Rogers, 2002; Coles et al., 2006; Minhat and 
Abdullah, 2016).  
Vega is the measurement of a stock option’s sensitivity to the volatility (or risk) of the 
underlying stock. Because the value of a stock option is positively related to the volatility of 
the underlying stock, the presence of vega will discourage managers from hedging against risk 
or volatility (e.g., Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; Aretz and Bartram, 2010). If hedging against 
credit risk can reduce a bank’s stock volatility (Nijskens and Wagner, 2011), then that risk 
management strategy is not in the best interest of managers who wish to increase the value of 
their stock options. Therefore, we conjecture that vega will provide bank managers with little 
incentive to buy CDS for hedging purposes.  
Our study contributes novel empirical evidence in support of the hypothesis that vega of 
stock options can disincentivize the use of CDS for risk management in banks. To our 
knowledge, this hypothesis has not been tested elsewhere. In this study, data of CEO stock 
options and the notional amount of CDS held for hedging by European banks during the period 
2006-2011 were examined. We find that CEO vega is negatively related to the proportion of 
CDS held for hedging, which is consistent with our hypothesis.  
However, the effect of such hedging activity is understandably beyond managerial control. 
In a further analysis, we find that the extent of CDS held for hedging is positively related to 
default risk in the period leading to the financial crisis that erupted in 2007. This finding 
suggests that banks’ default risk increases in times of systemic credit crisis even for banks with 
hedging positions in CDS. We refer to insights offered by previous studies (Stulz, 2010; 
Nijskens and Wagner, 2011; Fung et al., 2012) to rationalise this interesting observation. 
Previous studies argue that banks with hedging positions could also suffer increased default 
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risk due to credit contagion or the failure of counterparties to honour their promises to protect 
the banks against default risk (Sjostrom, 2009; Stulz, 2010). This calls into question the 
effectiveness of CDS in credit risk management.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review 
and development of hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample construction, data and variables 
used in this study. Section 4 describes the empirical analysis and discussion of results. Section 
5 provides a conclusion. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
2.1. Risk management theory: credit default swaps and managerial risk aversion  
Hedging with derivatives can be used to diversify firm-specific risk (Tufano, 1996; Jin and 
Jorion, 2006; Gao, 2010). The risk diversification potential offered by credit derivatives has 
been widely discussed and acknowledged (Hirtle, 2009). CDS, which represent the largest 
segment of the credit derivatives market, are considered to be important instruments that enable 
banks to manage their portfolio of credit risks more efficiently (Minton et al., 2009). These 
instruments create new hedging opportunities with a new, less expensive way to hedge or 
transfer credit risk to other entities (Ashcraft and Santos, 2009). Prior to the financial crisis, 
banks had dramatically increased their risk transfer activities through the use of CDS (Nijskens 
and Wagner, 2011).  
Bank managers are undoubtedly responsible for decision-making on behalf of shareholders, 
although a difference in risk preferences between managers and shareholders is not uncommon 
(Stulz, 1984; Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002). It is not impossible for a bank manager to be driven 
more by the need to protect their own interest in a risk management decision concerning the 
bank (Smith and Stulz, 1985). In particular, a manager’s risk aversion can motivate a decision 
to use CDS to reduce the bank’s credit risk more than may be desirable from the perspective 
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of shareholders. This situation is described as the risk-related incentive problem (Rajgopal and 
Shevlin, 2002). 
The risk-related incentive problem will arise when the manager is less diversified than 
shareholders, and has limited ability to diversify his wealth, which is tied to the value of the 
bank he manages (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In this situation, the values of the manager’s 
human capital and compensation or wealth are linked to the ongoing existence of the firm. This 
implies that an investment in a risky project would benefit (well-diversified) shareholders if 
the project is successful. But, if the project fails, it would be detrimental to the (less-diversified) 
manager, who risks losing his job and future flow of income (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Tufano, 1996). These risky prospects would encourage the manager to implement a risk 
management strategy such as using CDS to hedge the bank’s credit risk. However, this risk 
management strategy is not necessarily in the best interest of the bank’s shareholders, who 
would prefer managers to undertake risky strategies for the sake of greater returns.  
2.2. Agency theory: stock options as disincentives for risk management  
In comparison to managers, shareholders can diversify away their exposure to the non-
systematic risk of a particular bank by holding a sufficiently large basket of assets in their 
investment portfolios. This assumption of modern portfolio theory considers shareholders as 
risk-neutral investors. If this assumption holds, shareholders would prefer greater managerial 
risk-taking; hence, using CDS to reduce exposure to credit risk would be inconsistent with their 
interests. However, undiversified managers would prefer risk reduction to protect their 
interests; hence, CDS will be used to hedge against the exposure to credit risk (Stulz, 1984; 
Smith and Stulz, 1985; Graham and Rogers, 2002; Nijskens and Wagner, 2011; Fung et al., 
2012).  
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That said, although it can be argued that risk management is likely to be implemented by 
risk-averse managers mainly to reduce the bank’s risk in the pursuit of managers’ own interests, 
the managers are not necessarily risk-averse. This is because their risk-taking appetites can be 
enhanced by paying the managers stock options. Studies have indeed suggested that the risk-
related incentive problem between managers and shareholders as described above can be 
mitigated by including stock options in the managerial pay package (Stulz, 1984; Smith and 
Stulz, 1985; Tufano, 1996; Buck et al., 2003).  
Stock options have a convex payoff structure. The convexity of stock options is measured 
by vega (Core and Guay, 2002). Vega is the sensitivity of the option value with respect to a 
1% change in stock volatility. This means that stock option holders face negligible downside 
risk when the underlying stock price falls below the predetermined exercise price, but can earn 
enormous payoff when the price exceeds the exercise price. It follows that greater volatility 
will provide greater upside potential for the stock price and, consequently, for option values.  
If hedging against credit risk is perceived to reduce a bank’s stock volatility (Nijskens and 
Wagner, 2011), then managers who hold stock options will have little incentive to use CDS for 
hedging purposes, because such a strategy will reduce stock volatility and their option values 
(Smith and Stulz, 1985; Core and Guay, 2002). Therefore, we conjecture that greater stock 
options’ vega will disincentivize hedging against credit risk, and hence result in little use of 
CDS for credit risk management purposes. 
2.3. Development of hypotheses  
2.3.1 Stock options and credit default swaps for risk management in banks  
In the banking industry, the use of stock options is prevalent, and the percentage of stock 
options relative to total managerial compensation has also increased compared to industrial 
firms (Chen et al., 2006). Vega, as the risk-related incentive component of stock options, has 
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been considered an important determinant of corporate risk management involving derivatives 
use (Tufano, 1996; Gay and Nam, 1998; Guay, 1999; Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; Rogers, 
2002; Adkins et al., 2007; Supanvanij and Strauss, 2010). While CDS are predominantly used 
by banks, it is largely unknown whether the purpose of usage can be influenced by stock 
options’ vega. This is because previous studies focus only on other types of derivatives used 
by non-financial firms.   
Appendix A summarises empirical studies that have examined the use of stock options and 
non-credit derivatives by mainly non-financial firms. These studies were driven by the 
assumption that managerial risk aversion motivates corporate hedging with derivatives. 
Although a negative relationship between the use of derivatives and stock options is commonly 
documented, contradictory findings can also be observed (Géczy et al., 1997; Gay and Nam, 
1998). The mixed findings call for further research in this area, especially in the context of the 
banking industry, which is currently understudied.  
To our knowledge, empirical evidence on the relationship between the risk-related 
incentive component of stock options and the use of CDS for hedging in the banking industry 
is non-existent. A focus on banks is imperative, given the fact that banks are recognised as a 
major participant in the credit derivatives market that is dominated by CDS (BBA, 2006). 
Examining CDS is interesting because banks do not necessarily use these derivatives to manage 
or transfer credit risk away from their balance sheets. Studies have suggested that banks also 
take on new credit risk through their trading of these derivatives (Instefjord, 2005; Minton et 
al., 2009; Nijskens and Wagner, 2011).  
Our study focuses on the use of CDS for hedging purposes in banks. This is founded on 
risk management theory. In this context, banks are in the position to buy CDS with a view to 
reduce exposure to the credit risk of their risky assets. It is plausible for this hedging activity 
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to be restrained by the risk-taking appetites of the banks’ CEOs, who are deemed influential in 
making decisions on behalf of shareholders. A CEO whose risk-taking appetite is enhanced 
through the implementation of greater stock option vega will have little incentive to reduce a 
bank’s exposure to credit risk if doing so will reduce stock volatility and hence option values. 
Based on an assumed link between credit risk and stock volatility, we conjecture that the 
implementation of greater vega for bank CEOs will disincentivize the use of CDS for hedging 
purposes. This leads us to the first hypothesis: 
H1: CEO vega is negatively related to the proportion of CDS held for hedging purposes. 
Although the focus of the present study is on the use of CDS for hedging purposes, a 
robustness check is also performed by considering CDS held for trading purposes. This is to 
ensure that the analysis is not impaired by a possible misclassification error between hedging 
and trading purposes. The involvement of banks in the trading of CDS as part of risk-taking 
activity is widely acknowledged (Minton et al., 2009; Stulz, 2010; Corsi et al., 2011; Nijskens 
and Wagner, 2011). In this context, one can argue that the risk-taking incentives generated by 
stock options can incentivize selling of CDS that would load a bank’s investment portfolios 
with new credit risk. Being on the selling side of the contracts will cause banks’ stock volatility, 
and hence stock options’ value, to increase, which is consistent with the CEOs’ interest in stock 
options. Therefore, we conjecture that the implementation of greater vega for bank CEOs will 
incentivize the use of CDS for trading purposes as described above. This leads us to the second 
hypothesis: 
H2: CEO vega is positively related to the proportion of CDS held for trading purposes. 
2.3.2 Credit default swaps and default risk in crisis periods 
The risk management literature suggests that derivatives used for hedging purposes will 
reduce risk, and hence reducing stock return volatility (Smith and Stulz, 1985; Hentschel and 
Kothari, 2001; Stulz, 2004; Fung et al., 2012). Minton et al. (2009) examine banks’ use of 
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credit derivatives in the United States. They use a sample of 395 banks from 1999 to 2005 and 
find that only 23 large banks, out of 395, used credit derivatives, and most of their derivatives 
positions were held for trading activities rather than for hedging of loans (i.e. risky assets). 
They note that the use of credit derivatives by banks to hedge loans is limited, while the effect 
is largely unknown. 
Nijskens and Wagner (2011) examine the relationship between bank credit risk transfer 
activities and bank risk. They focus on the association between the use of CDS and banks’ risk 
as measured by beta. The sample consists of 38 banks from 1998 to 2006. They find that the 
use of CDS is associated with an increase in a bank’s risk. They believe that the use of CDS 
increases bank risk because banks trade them to source new credit risk. 
Fung et al. (2012) examine the effects of CDS usage on the risk profile and firm value of 
US insurance companies for the period 2001-2009. They use a sample of 113 Property/Casualty 
(PC) and 78 life insurance companies. They distinguish between the usage of CDS for hedging 
purposes and for income generation or trading purposes. They find that the use of CDS for 
hedging purposes is not necessarily negatively related to firm risk.  
Other studies have examined derivatives other than CDS. Their findings are listed in 
Appendix B. First, it can be observed that previous findings are generally mixed. Second, the 
effect of derivatives use on default risk has not been investigated. These factors justify the need 
to investigate the link between default risk and the use of CDS, especially in the context of the 
banking industry, which has predominantly used these derivatives. The absence of definitive 
findings in previous studies as reflected from the mixed results, provides little guidance in 
terms of the expected direction for the relationship between CDS and default risk.  
Although our first hypothesis implies that managers with lower vega will be more likely to 
use CDS for hedging purposes, the effect of such hedging activity is understandably beyond 
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managers’ control. Based on previous studies (Stulz, 2010; Nijskens and Wagner, 2011; Fung 
et al., 2012), we argue that the use of CDS even for hedging purposes is likely to attract an 
unintended effect in times of systemic credit crisis. This is a plausible scenario because the 
default protections promised through these derivatives will be no longer available when 
insurers (sellers) themselves fail on their obligations to protect buyers against the defaults of 
underlying securities (Sjostrom, 2009; Stulz, 2010). In this case, hedgers are no longer 
protected from the default risk of their risky assets, and expose to a portfolio of credit risk that 
is greater than they had accounted for. In this situation, the negative news could trigger 
increased default risk for both buyers and sellers of CDS through the counterparty risk channel 
of credit contagion (Jorion and Zhang, 2009). This argument leads to the third hypothesis:  
H3: The proportion of CDS held by banks is positively related to default risk in the crisis 
period. 
To test this hypothesis, the analysis is broken down into three distinct periods: prior to the 
financial crisis, the period of the financial crisis and the post-crisis period. As part of our 
robustness check, we distinguish between the usage of CDS for hedging purposes and for 
trading purposes. 
3. DATA AND VARIABLES 
3.1. Sample 
This study is based on a sample of European publicly listed banks. The final sample consists 
of 60 banks and covers the period from 2006 to 2011. The list of European banks was drawn 
from two categories: European stock market indices and premier indices of the European Union 
countries (EU-27) (Fasshauer et al., 2008). The constituents of these two categories were 112 
banks, in which 38 banks were cross-listed. This means there were effectively only 74 banks 
after considering the cross-listing factor. The final sample of 60 banks was derived after 
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excluding 14 banks based on the reasons set forth in Table 1. In brief, the final sample 
comprises banks that were listed on 22 European stock market indices and included in one of 
three European indices (i.e., FTSE Eurotop 100 Index, FTS Eurofirst 300 Index and 
Euronext100). The sample construction is summarised in Table 1. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
3.2. Variables 
3.2.1. Credit default swaps held by banks 
The adoption of International Accounting Standard (IAS) No. 39 on Financial Instruments: 
Recognition and Measurement, which became effective from the reporting period beginning 
on 1 January 2005, has enriched the disclosure of derivatives use by European banks. The 
disclosures of derivatives use under this international regime are more systematic and 
standardised across banks. Prior to 2005, most European banks applied domestic accounting 
standards, which differ significantly between countries. The year 2005 is excluded from our 
sample because it represents a transition period from the domestic accounting system to the 
international accounting regime.  
The international accounting regime requires users of derivatives to disclose in their annual 
reports the objectives for holding derivatives (Barth and Landsman, 2010). Users of derivatives 
are also expected to distinguish between derivatives held for hedging purposes and those held 
for trading purposes. The notional amounts of CDS held for hedging as reported in the banks’ 
annual reports are used to gauge the extent of such hedging activity. As part of our robustness 
checks, we also collect data on the notional amounts of CDS used for trading purposes.  
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Notional amounts were commonly considered in previous studies on derivatives (e.g., Gay 
and Nam, 1998; Hentschel and Kothari, 2001; Supanvanij and Strauss, 2010). We do not use 
the fair values of derivatives, because such information was not disclosed adequately across 
banks, as the option for fair value recognition was carved out from the adoption of IAS 39, 
implemented at the start of 2005 (European Commission, 2004).  
3.2.2. Stock options’ vega 
We employ a methodology developed by Core and Guay (2002) in measuring the risk-
taking incentives arising from CEO stock options. Core and Guay's approximation method is 
widely used in the stock option compensation literature (e.g., Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; 
Coles et al., 2006; Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011). In this context, vega is commonly 
measured based upon the partial derivative of the dividend-adjusted Black-Scholes equation 
with respect to the annual standard deviation of stock returns. The partial derivative is then 
multiplied by 0.01 to represent the pound change in an option value resulting from a 1% change 
in the standard deviation. The risk-taking incentive is then estimated by multiplying the 
generated value by the number of stock options held (Guay, 1999; Core and Guay, 2002; 
Rogers, 2002; Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011; Gao, 2010).1 Further details are presented in 
Appendix C. The values of a stock option’s parameters, such as the exercise price and time to 
expiry, were hand-collected from the banks’ annual reports. Other data were collected from 
Datastream. 
3.2.3. Default risk 
A bank’s default risk is measured through the Merton Distance-to-Default (DD) model, 
which is commonly used in previous studies (Gropp et al., 2006; Akhigbe et al., 2007; Bharath 
                                                          
1 Vega for stock holdings is zero (Guay, 1999). Following prior literature, the calculation of vega is based on stock 
options compensation (e.g. Rogers, 2002; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011; Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011). 
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and Shumway, 2008; Campbell et al., 2008; Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2011). This model 
provides a direct assessment of default likelihood using both accounting and market data 
(Saldías, 2013). An advantage of using the DD model to capture a bank’s default risk is that it 
implicitly captures the bank’s expected returns via the inclusion of the market value of assets 
(Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011).  
The model shown in Appendix C considers the book values of liabilities and market 
valuation of assets in estimating default risk. The ‘distance to default’ represents the number 
of standard deviations away from the default point, where the default point is defined as the 
point when the value of a bank’s assets is equal to the value of its liabilities (Gropp et al., 2006). 
It is considered an appropriate indicator of default risk because it accounts for three crucial 
factors of fragility: the market value of assets, leverage and the volatility of assets (Gropp et 
al., 2006; Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011). 
In this study, distance to default is calculated for each bank in the sample and for each time 
period, using the prevailing period's equity market data and balance sheet data. Data to compute 
annual distance to default were gathered from Datastream and input into the formula shown in 
Appendix C. A shorter distance to default (i.e., lower distance to default) indicates higher 
default risk (Gropp et al., 2006).  
3.2.4. Other variables 
Appendix D lists the control variables and their definitions used in this study. Data on 
compensation (salary, bonuses, stock grants), CEO characteristics (ownership, age and tenure) 
and banks’ diversification were hand-collected. Data for other bank characteristics were 
downloaded from Datastream. The country-specific factor is controlled through the levels of 
local competition based on the number of banks in each country. According to Cournovian’s 
partial equilibrium model, there is a positive relationship between the degree of competition 
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and the number of firms (Fama and Laffer, 1972). We also use country dummy as a robustness 
check. In addition, we incorporate non-performing loans (NPLs) as another country-specific 
variable. The NPLs are based on the average ratios of NPL across banks in each country (value 
equals one if the NPL ratio is lower than the average NPL ratio of European banks, and zero 
otherwise). The ratios are based on the report produced by the European Banking Authority 
(EBA, 2015). 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
4.1. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Panel 1 of Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of variables used in the regression 
analysis. As reported, the average notional amount of CDS held for hedging is £1.59 billion, 
while the average notional amount held for trading is £151.43 billion. Consistent with the 
findings in Nijskens and Wagner (2011) and Minton et al. (2009), CDS used for trading 
purposes represents a significant portion of the average notional amount of CDS held by our 
sample banks. That said, the focus of our study is on risk management, and hence the amount 
of CDS held for hedging. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
It is important to highlight here that our study reports the notional amounts of CDS held by 
a sample of European banks, which have not been documented elsewhere. For benchmarking 
purposes, the total notional amount of credit derivatives held by large banks in the United 
States was $5,526 billion in 2005 (Minton et al., 2009). The average total notional amount of 
CDS used by 30 life insurance firms in the United States during the 2001-2009 period was 
$590 billion (Fung et al., 2012).  
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Table 2 also reports that the average natural logarithm of stock options’ vega is 2.40. The 
monetary value of vega is £23,264, which is significantly lower than the $155,523 reported for 
a sample of banks in the United States (Belkhir and Boubaker, 2013). It is plausible for risk-
taking incentives in the United States to be generally higher than in Europe. This observation 
is consistent with Conyon and Murphy’s (2000) suggestion that American executives may be 
less risk-averse than their counterparts elsewhere. The perceived conservativeness of CEOs in 
European banks simply reinforces the relevance of credit-risk hedging activities and the need 
for risk-taking incentives, which are the focus of the present study. Panel 2 of Table 2 shows 
the mean distribution of data by country, with a focus on countries with significant observation 
of hedging with CDS.  
Table 3 reports the correlations among explanatory variables. Given the high correlation 
coefficients among few variables, regression diagnostic tests were performed to determine the 
variance inflation factors (VIF) for the variables. This post-estimation test is used to detect the 
presence of a serious multicollinearity problem in each regression specification. We reduce the 
possibility of a serious multicollinearity problem by ensuring that the variance inflation factors 
(VIF) for independent variables are less than 10 (Gujarati, 2003). 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
4.2. Regression models 
Tobit and panel data regressions are employed to test the first hypothesis.2 This is to 
examine the relationship between CEOs’ risk-taking incentives (vega) and the proportion of 
CDS held by banks for hedging purposes. Model (1) below shows that vega is a key explanatory 
                                                          
2 Both fixed- and random-effects estimations were employed. The results of random effects are reported and 
preferred based on the results of the Hausman test.  
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variable that is deemed capable of influencing the extent of hedging position in CDS, as 
denoted by CDS-hedging in Equation (1) below: 
CDS-hedging = ƒ (Vega + control variables)       (1) 
To test the second hypothesis, which is part of the robustness check, the proportion of CDS 
held by banks for trading purposes is used as the dependent variable. Stock options’ vega 
remains the key explanatory variable, as illustrated in Equation (2) below: 
CDS-trading = ƒ (Vega + control variables)        (2) 
Logit regressions were also employed to test the first and second hypotheses as part of the 
robustness check. For the third hypothesis, the effect of CDS use on a bank’s default risk, as 
measured by the Merton distance to default, is tested using two-stage least squares regression 
(2SLS). Predicted values of the notional amount of CDS held scaled by total assets were used 
as the key explanatory variable in Equation (3) below. This implies that the variable is modelled 
as an endogenous variable: 
Default risk = ƒ [CDS (predicted) + control variables]                            (3) 
CDS (predicted) is endogenously determined by stock options’ vega, salary, derivatives-
hedging, derivatives-trading, leverage and others. Salary is considered an instrumental 
variable. To produce meaningful results, the regression analysis is performed for three different 
periods. The first is the period before the financial crisis (2006), the second is the period of the 
financial crisis (2007-2009), and the third is the period after the financial crisis (2010-2011). 
For robustness, the regression analysis in Equation (3) above is performed separately for CDS 
held for hedging and those held for trading purposes.  
4.3. Regression results 
4.3.1. Stock options and credit default swaps for risk management in banks 
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The regression results in relation to the first hypothesis are presented in Table 4. The 
dependent variable for Columns 1-3 is the extent of hedging positions in CDS. This is measured 
by the ratio of the notional amount of CDS held for hedging to the total notional amount of 
CDS held (i.e. trading plus hedging purposes) at date t+1. Columns 1, 4, 5 and 6 of Table 4 
report the results for the full sample (i.e., 300 observations), while Columns 2 and 3 report the 
results for the subsample containing only users of CDS (i.e., 134 observations).  
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
As a robustness check, for Column 4, the dependent variable is equal to one if the firm uses 
CDS for hedging purposes, and zero otherwise. For Column 5, the dependent variable is the 
notional amount of CDS held for hedging at date t+1. For Column 6, the dependent variable is 
the notional amount of CDS held for hedging scaled by total assets at date t+1.  
Overall, Table 4 reports that CEOs’ risk-taking incentives, as measured by vega, are 
negatively related to the use of CDS for hedging purposes. The significance and negative beta 
coefficients on vega support our first hypothesis. The findings are consistent with the notion 
that risk-taking incentives provided by stock options disincentivize banks’ CEOs from using 
CDS as risk management tools to hedge credit risk. CEOs with stock options are less likely to 
use CDS to hedge credit risk. This is because they perceive that doing so will reduce the 
volatility of the banks’ stock returns, and hence the value of their stock options. 
Our findings on CEOs’ reluctance to hedge in the presence of stock options are consistent 
with the findings in previous studies that have suggested the role of stock options in reducing 
hedging intensity. For example, based on a sample of oil and gas producers, Rajgopal and 
Shevlin (2002) document that the incentives generated by stock options exhibit a negative 
relation with oil price hedging. Our findings enrich the literature by expanding the scope of 
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investigation to credit risk hedging in the banking industry. This is novel empirical evidence 
that suggests stock options are disincentives to buying CDS for hedging purposes. 
As part of our robustness checks, we then test the second hypothesis by using trading 
positions in CDS as the dependent variable. The variable is measured by the ratio of the 
notional amount of CDS held for trading to the total notional amount of CDS held (i.e. trading 
plus hedging purposes) at date t+1. The results are reported in Table 5.  
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
Overall, Table 5 reports that CEOs’ risk-taking incentives are positively related to trading 
position in CDS. The significant and positive beta coefficients on vega support our second 
hypothesis. The findings are consistent with the notion that risk-taking incentives provided by 
stock options incentivize banks’ CEOs to use CDS to source new credit risk, as in the case of 
selling instead of buying the derivatives. This strategy will increase the volatility of the banks’ 
stock returns, and in turn the value of stock options, in the interest of the CEOs. Although this 
risky strategy is in alignment with the interests of shareholders, taking on new credit risk 
through selling CDS can increase the bank’s default risk. The risk can be catastrophic in periods 
of systemic credit crisis (Rajan, 2006). This leads to our next investigation on default risk in 
relation to the use of CDS.   
4.3.2. Credit default swaps and default risk 
An investigation of the relationship between the use of CDS and the default risk in the 
banking industry is related to our third hypothesis. The findings of previous studies in this area 
are mixed, which warrants the need for further investigation. Given that default risk increased 
systemically during the crisis that erupted in 2007, we split the sample into three subsamples. 
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The first represents a period before the financial crisis (2006), the second is the period of the 
financial crisis (2007-2009) and the third is the period after the financial crisis (2010-2011).  
The dependent variable is a bank’s distance to default, as measured through the formula 
shown in Appendix C. Shorter (or lower value of) distance to default indicates higher default 
risk. The first analysis uses CDS-hedging (predicted) as a key explanatory variable. CDS-
hedging is measured as the total notional amount of CDS held for hedging scaled by total assets. 
CDS-hedging (predicted) is endogenously determined by stock options’ vega and other 
variables, which can be implied through the (first-stage) regression results presented in Column 
6 of Table 4. Other variables include salary, derivatives-hedging, derivatives-trading and 
leverage. The second-stage regression results are presented in Table 6. Column 6 of Table 4 
shows that salary is negatively related to CDS-hedging, while Table 6 shows salary is not 
significantly related to default risk. Therefore, salary is considered an instrumental variable in 
this context. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 report statistically significant coefficients between the variable 
CDS-hedging (predicted) and banks’ distance to default, which is consistent with our third 
hypothesis. Interestingly, the sign of coefficients is negative. These suggest that hedging with 
CDS coincides with greater default risk in the period before and during the crisis. This finding 
is consistent with that documented in Fung et al. (2012), which suggests that the hedging effect 
of CDS may not necessarily materialise in the anticipated direction. 
It is important to note that the variable CDS-hedging we employ here represents only a 
negligible part of banks’ CDS portfolios. Previous studies have suggested that CDS were 
mainly used for income generation, rather than hedging (Minton et al., 2009; Nijskens and 
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Wagner, 2011). Therefore, the hedging effect may be insignificant to reduce banks’ default 
risk, especially in times of systemic credit crisis, when the ability of insurers to fulfil their 
obligations to protect as promised through the swap contracts is suspect.  
That said, we now turn to the second analysis that identifies CDS-trading as a key 
explanatory variable for default risk. CDS-trading is measured as the total notional amount of 
CDS held for trading scaled by total assets. CDS-trading (predicted) is endogenously 
determined by stock options’ vega and other variables, as shown in Column 6 of Table 5. The 
second-stage regression results are presented in Table 7. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
The results reported in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 demonstrate significant coefficients 
between the variable CDS-trading (predicted) and banks’ distance to default, which is again 
consistent with our third hypothesis. The negative coefficients imply that trading positions in 
CDS are associated with greater default risk. This finding is very much anticipated, as trading 
positions in CDS are likely to involve taking on additional credit risk in investment portfolios. 
This risky strategy will definitely increase the bank’s default risk, especially in the period 
leading up to the systemic credit crisis, when the bank may encounter a liquidity crisis and 
consequently fail to honour its ‘promise to protect’ under the swap contracts.   
Quite unexpectedly, banks’ involvement in CDS for hedging may be viewed rather 
negatively by the market. This notion is supported by Nijskens and Wagner’s (2011) findings 
that suggest a bank’s beta increased at the onset of its involvement in CDS. In this case, default 
risk can be expected to increase as well. This effect should be more apparent as early as the 
year immediately before the crisis, when the market would have anticipated the failures of 
CDS’ sellers to honour their obligations, as in the case of the American International Group, 
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Inc. (AIG) (Sjostrom, 2009). When insurers failed to fulfil their obligations, the default 
protection promised by CDS turned out to be illusionary (Stulz, 2010). In this case, hedgers are 
no longer protected, and become exposed to credit risk that is greater than they had previously 
managed and accounted for.  
5. CONCLUSION 
To our knowledge, empirical evidence on the relationship between the use of stock options 
and CDS for hedging purposes in the banking industry is non-existent. Focusing on banks is 
imperative given the fact that banks are recognised as a major participant in the credit 
derivatives market that is dominated by CDS. Knowing that risk appetites at banks can be 
incentivized through the use of stock options, this poses the question of whether such a 
commonly implemented pay practice disincentivizes the use of CDS for risk management in 
banks. 
In this study, data of CEO stock options and the notional amount of CDS held for hedging 
by European banks during the period 2006-2011 were examined. We find that CEO vega is 
negatively related to the proportion of CDS held by banks for hedging. Robustness checks 
show that such a negative relationship does not hold when CDS are held for trading purposes. 
The results, taken together, suggest the role of stock options’ vega as a disincentive for hedging 
positions, and an incentive for trading positions in CDS contracts. 
In further analysis, we find that the extent of CDS held by banks is related to default risk 
during the period leading up to the financial crisis that erupted in 2007. In times of systemic 
credit crisis, a bank’s default risk increases even with hedging positions in CDS. During such 
a period, default protection promised by swap contracts may no longer be available when 
insurers (sellers) themselves fail in their obligation to protect. In this case, hedging positions 
are no longer protected from the default risk of their risky assets, and become exposed to a 
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portfolio of credit risk that is greater than they had anticipated. This means that the systemic 
condition can only increase the default risk for both buyers and sellers of CDS. 
In conclusion, although it can be gathered from our findings that restraining the use of stock 
options can incentivize credit risk hedging, this measure will not necessarily lower default risk. 
The effectiveness of CDS as credit risk management instruments is questionable. This is 
because the intended hedging effect of CDS is likely to be constrained by factors that are within 
the control of neither the hedgers nor their managers. Negative market perception coupled with 
illusive protection associated with CDS is perhaps a manifestation of (undiversified) 
counterparty risk. Managing this risk will require a solution that goes beyond restraining the 
use of stock options. 
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2 TABLE 1 
Sample Construction 
No. of 
banks 
Sample selection criteria 
  Category 1 
13 
FTSE Eurotop 100 Index 
Banks listed in the European stock 
market indices 
21 FTSEurofirst 300 Index 
6 
Euronext100 
72 Premier segment of 27 European stock exchanges 
Category 2 
 
Banks included in the premier 
indices of 27 European countries 
   
(38) Listed on more than one index Cross-listed  
   
74   
 
 
 
Elimination criteria 
(1) English version of annual report not available Annual report not available  
(3) Merged or acquired during the sample period Merger or acquisition  
(10) 
Banks that do not provide adequate details of CEO 
compensation 
Missing data 
 
   
60 
 
 
Total banks in the sample 
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3 TABLE 2 
Panel 1 - Descriptive statistics 
 Mean Min Max Stdev 
     
CDS-trading (£mil) 151,430 0 4,129,244 476,902 
     
CDS-hedging (£mil) 1,592 0 114,422 10,117 
     
CEO vega (ln)        2.40  -9.27   14.16        4.41  
     
Salary (£000) 654 5 3,476 554 
     
Bonus (£000) 409 0 5,985 852 
     
Stock grants (£000) 980 0 41,033 3,239 
     
%Ownership  0.004 0 0.190 0.019 
     
Derivatives-hedging (£mil) 620,423 0 48,800,000 4,837,875 
     
Derivatives- trading (£mil) 2,302,121 0 49,400,000 7,292,426 
     
Investment opportunities 1.35 0 6.35 0.98 
     
Leverage 0.32 0 0.93 0.19 
     
Distance to default 7.260 2.544 62.172 6.780 
     
Size (£mil) 2,328,592 14 79,339,694 10,021,541 
     
Diversification (no. of segments) 3.64 1 10 2 
     
Tenure  5 1 28 4.057 
     
Age  54 35 70 7.271 
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Panel 2 – Mean distribution by country 
 Germany Italy Spain Denmark France Portugal Others 
        
CDS-trading (£mil) 1,328 24,753 16,825 0 1,019,752 1,511 132,337 
        
CDS-hedging (£mil) 11,217 301 11,167 1,476 248 32 5 
        
CEO vega (ln)        0.00         2.66         0.78         4.95  6.12   0.43        2.44  
        
Salary (£000) 781 741 1,338 596 719 518 546 
        
Bonus (£000) 1,221 361 1,267 86 470 401 241 
        
Stock grants (£000) 2,374 3 1,059 125 22 827 1,187 
        
%Ownership  0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.007 
        
Derivatives-hedging (£mil) 11,200,000 41,974 43,139 14,471 365,308 9,415 41,701 
        
Derivatives- trading (£mil) 2,910,737 487,333 605,041 23,086 14,500,000 39,676 1,814,547 
        
Investment opportunities 0.90 0.87 1.46 1.22 0.84 1.32 1.52 
        
Leverage 0.33 0.47 0.46 0.41 0.21 0.40 0.27 
        
Distance to default 18.678 7.604 6.994 7.073 8.811 11.178 5.690 
        
Size (£mil) 5,287,752 1,243,075 2,947,174 1,487,958 8,233,321 438,669 1,777,613 
        
Diversification (no. of segments) 4.44 2.39 3.47 6.00 6.08 5.54 3.19 
        
Tenure  3 4 5 12 4 6 5 
        
Age  56 53 58 59 56 61 52 
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TABLE 3 – Correlations for explanatory variables 
 CEO 
vega 
Distance 
to default 
Volatility Salary Bonus Stock 
grants 
Owner- 
ship 
Derivatives 
(hedging) 
Derivatives 
(trading) 
Invest. 
opp. 
Leve-
rage 
Size Diversi-
fication 
Country 
factor 
NPLs Age Tenure 
CEO vega 1.000                 
                  
Distance to 
default 
-0.106* 1.000                
                  
Volatility 0.190*** 0.195*** 1.000               
                  
Salary 0.086 0.133** 0.231*** 1.000              
                  
Bonus 0.299*** -0.032 0.158*** 0.360*** 1.000             
                  
Stock grants 0.104* -0.035 0.008 0.206*** 0.234*** 1.000            
                  
Ownership -0.079 -0.101* -0.115** -0.250*** -0.010 -0.061 1.000           
                  
Derivatives 
(hedging) 
0.066 -0.015 0.146** 0.356*** 0.284*** 0.133** 0.148 1.000          
                  
Derivatives 
(trading) 
0.193*** -0.112* 0.161*** 0.441*** 0.258*** 0.101* -0.099* 0.063*** 1.000         
                  
Invest. opp. 0.086 -0.397*** -0.096* -0.243*** 0.071 0.063 0.096* -0.144** -0.050 1.000        
                  
Leverage 0.010 0.165*** 0.076 0.182*** 0.180*** -0.068 -0.248*** 0.102* 0.085 -0.068 1.000       
                  
Size 0.262*** 0.055 0.211*** 0.154*** 0.304*** 0.131** -0.052 0.106* 0.085 0.048 0.027 1.000      
                  
Diversification 0.195*** 0.155*** 0.134** 0.457*** 0.200*** 0.127** -0.155*** 0.187*** 0.210*** -0.214*** 0.079 0.119* 1.000     
                  
Country factor 0.210*** 0.154*** 0.013 0.409*** 0.290*** 0.115* -0.354*** 0.145** 0.291*** -0.134** 0.109* 0.118* 0.158*** 1.000    
                  
NPLs 0.177*** 0.191*** 0.144** 0.242*** 0.114** 0.245*** 0.093 0.233*** 0.271*** -0.154*** -0.077 0.195*** 0.351*** 0.172*** 1.000   
                  
Age -0.083 0.021 0.005 0.261*** 0.200*** 0.091 0.023 0.196*** 0.136** -0.096* -0.054 0.022 0.193*** 0.077 0.028 1.000  
                  
Tenure -0.009 -0.069 -0.022 0.004 0.014 -0.067 0.044 0.080 -0.013 0.026 -0.026 -0.048 0.127** -0.014 -0.060 0.339*** 1.000 
Definitions of variables are available in Appendix D. ***, ** and * show statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10 % levels, respectively. 
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4  5 TABLE 4 
CEO risk-taking incentives (vega) and CDS for hedging purposes 
 
 (1)   (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
 
 
Independent  
variables 
 
 
 
Tobit 
   
 
 
Tobit 
  
 
Random 
Effects 
 
  
Robustness Check 
 
     
Logit 
  
Tobit 
  
Tobit 
 
        
CEO vega  -0.029 *  -0.056 *** -0.007 ** -0.115 ** -0.781 ** -0.226 *** 
 (0.054)  (0.000) (0.056) (0.015) (0.036) (0.003) 
Distance to default -0.009   0.000 -0.041   
 (0.581)   (0.939) (0.406)   
Salary -0.099  -0.156 * -0.051 -0.332 -1.728 -1.389 *** 
 (0.238)  (0.087) (0.131) (0.257) (0.442) (0.000) 
Bonus 0.026  0.040 * -0.001 0.146 ** 1.128 * 0.166 
 (0.260)  (0.079) (0.887) (0.042) (0.051) (0.171) 
Stock grants 0.000  0.000 0.024 *** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.500)  (0.419) (0.005) (0.685) (0.918) (0.831) 
Ownership -1.114  -1.772 -2.519 5.909 55.415 -9.294 
 (0.943)  (0.933) (0.320) (0.754) (0.901) (0.644) 
Derivatives-hedging 0.151 ***  0.004 -0.015 0.484 *** 3.666 *** 0.844 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.887) (0.134) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Derivatives-trading -0.043 *  -0.075 *** 0.001 -0.019 -0.139 -0.256 ** 
 (0.072)  (0.002) (0.924) (0.873) (0.817) (0.042) 
Invest. opportunities     -0.001  0.351 ** 0.053 * -0.274 -1.368 -0.112 
 (0.993)  (0.026) (0.067) (0.573) (0.711) (0.863) 
Leverage 1.151 **  1.706 *** -0.206 6.155 *** 44.432 *** 2.886 * 
 (0.015)  (0.009) (0.483) (0.002) (0.001) (0.097) 
Size 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.335)  (0.233) (0.449) (0.115) (0.172) (0.196) 
Diversification 0.067 **  -0.007 0.003 0.293 *** 2.179 *** 0.093 
 (0.029)  (0.816) (0.831) (0.003) (0.005) (0.543) 
NPLs  -0.114  0.047 -0.124 -0.447 -4.557 -2.525 *** 
 (0.454)  (0.747) (0.345) (0.361) (0.212) (0.001) 
Country factor 0.475 ***  0.381 *** 0.022 *** 1.561 *** 12.880 *** 1.891 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
        
Year dummy Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
        
No. Observations 300  134  134 300 300 300 
        
Pseudo R2 0.310  0.320  0.385 0.165 0.042 
        
R2 within    0.159    
        
R2 between    0.327    
        
R2 overall    0.244    
            
 For Columns 1-3, the dependent variable is the extent of CDS held for hedging at date t+1, measured by the notional 
amount of the CDS used for hedging divided by total CDS usage (trading plus hedging). Columns 1, 4, 5 and 6 
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report the results for the full sample, while Columns 2-3 report the results for the subsample containing only CDS 
users (i.e., only 134 bank-years used CDS). As a robustness check, for Column 4, the dependent variable is equal to 
1 if the firm uses CDS for hedging purposes, and 0 otherwise. For Column 5, the dependent variable is the notional 
amount of CDS held for hedging at date t+1. For Column 6, the dependent variable is the notional amount of CDS 
held for hedging scaled by total assets at date t+1. All variables are defined in Appendix D. The p-values are reported 
in parentheses. ***, ** and * show statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10 % levels, respectively. 
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6  7 TABLE 5 
CEO risk-taking incentives (vega) and CDS for trading purposes 
 
 (1)   (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
 
 
Independent  
variables 
 
 
 
Tobit 
   
 
 
Tobit 
  
 
Random 
Effects 
 
  
Robustness Check 
 
     
Logit 
  
Tobit 
  
Tobit 
 
        
CEO vega  0.030 ***  0.017 *** 0.007 * 0.113 ** 0.652 *** 0.320 *** 
 (0.007)  (0.006) (0.056) (0.014) (0.001) (0.001) 
Distance to default -0.014   -0.000 -0.020   
 (0.347)   (0.939) (0.565)   
Salary 0.062  0.091 * 0.051 0.171 1.443 -1.791 * 
 (0.373)  (0.066) (0.131) (0.474) (0.274) (0.093) 
Bonus 0.032 *  -0.014 0.001 0.107 * 0.751 ** 0.375 ** 
 (0.080)  (0.226) (0.887) (0.078) (0.025) (0.013) 
Stock grants 0.000  0.000 -0.024 *** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.555)  (0.233) (0.005) (0.838) (0.405) (0.704) 
Ownership -4.245  1.269 2.519 -17.248 -83.325 -51.176 ** 
 (0.509)  (0.829) (0.320) (0.676) (0.511) (0.041) 
Derivatives-hedging 0.082 ***  -0.017 0.015 0.213 *** 1.333 *** 0.275 
 (0.001)  (0.281) (0.134) (0.006) (0.002) (0.143) 
Derivatives-trading 0.104 ***  0.062 *** -0.001 0.364 *** 2.398 *** 0.988 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.924) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Invest. opportunities     -0.519 ***  -0.162 ** -0.053 * -1.517 *** -9.586 *** -3.107 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.031) (0.067) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.100  -0.088 0.206 -0.799 -2.843 -4.964 ** 
 (0.774)  (0.725) (0.483) (0.407) (0.659) (0.022) 
Size 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.877)  (0.812) (0.449) (0.467) (0.562) (0.195) 
Diversification 0.084 ***  0.007 0.003 0.274 *** 1.459 *** 0.480 ** 
 (0.000)  (0.610) (0.831) (0.000) (0.001) (0.012) 
NPLs  -0.064  -0.047 0.124 -0.478 -0.658 -0.746 
 (0.584)  (0.516) (0.345) (0.206) (0.756) (0.426) 
Country factor 0.080  -0.167 *** -0.022 *** 0.407 * 1.657 -1.184 
 (0.250)  (0.000) (0.008) (0.097) (0.196) (0.743) 
        
Year dummy Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
        
No. Observations 300  134  134 300 300 300 
        
Pseudo R2 0.329  0.344  0.440 0.166 0.075 
        
R2 within    0.158    
        
R2 between    0.327    
        
R2 overall    0.244    
            
 For Columns 1-3, the dependent variable is the extent of CDS held for trading at date t+1, measured by the notional 
amount of the CDS used for trading divided by total CDS usage (trading plus hedging). Columns 1, 4, 5 and 6 report 
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the results for the full sample, while Columns 2-3 report the results for the subsample containing only CDS users 
(i.e., only 134 bank-years used CDS). As a robustness check, for Column 4, the dependent variable is equal to 1 if 
the firm uses CDS for trading purposes, and 0 otherwise. For Column 5, the dependent variable is the notional 
amount of CDS held for trading at date t+1. For Column 6, the dependent variable is the notional amount of CDS 
held for trading scaled by total assets at date t+1. All variables are defined in Appendix D. The p-values are reported 
in parentheses. ***, ** and * show statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10 % levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 6 
 
 
  
Default risk and the use of CDS for hedging purposes  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Independent variables 
Before the  
financial crisis 
During the  
financial crisis 
After the  
financial crisis 
     
CDS-hedging (predicted) -0.575 *** -0.594 ** 0.313 
 (0.008) (0.014) (0.514) 
Salary -0.151 -0.283 -0.780 
 (0.729) (0.507) (0.341) 
Bonus -0.189 -0.188 -0.409 
 (0.279) (0.217) (0.148) 
Leverage 5.477 ** 6.998 *** 2.315 
 (0.011) (0.006) (0.647) 
Investment opportunities   -0.569 -5.073 *** -1.996 
 (0.523) (0.000) (0.116) 
Size 0.696 0.553 *** 0.711 
 (0.044) (0.000) (0.257) 
Tenure 0.113 0.073 0.029 
 (0.394) (0.504) (0.899) 
Age -0.002 -0.024 -0.062 
 (0.971) (0.706) (0.568) 
Diversification  -0.073 -0.057 -0.081 
 (0.732) (0.775) (0.834) 
    
Country Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
    
No. Observations 60 180 120 
    
Adjusted R²  0.386 0.443 0.340 
    
The results of two-stage regressions. The dependent variable is the bank’s default risk as measured by Merton distance 
to default. CDS-hedging is the total notional amount of CDS held for hedging scaled by total assets. CDS-hedging 
(predicted) is endogenously determined by stock options’ vega and other variables. The first-stage regressions are not 
reported here for the sake of brevity. ***, ** and * show statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10 % levels, 
respectively. 
 
 
39 
 
  
TABLE 7 
 
Robustness check: Default risk and the use of CDS for trading purposes  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Independent variables 
Before the  
financial crisis 
During the  
financial crisis 
After the  
financial crisis 
     
CDS-trading (predicted) -0.247 * -0.349 *** -0.416* 
 (0.058) (0.005) (0.060) 
Salary -0.136 0.146 -0.410 
 (0.767) (0.761) (0.614) 
Bonus -0.190 -0.156 -0.177 
 (0.309) (0.335) (0.506) 
Leverage 2.549 6.063 ** 5.642 
 (0.194) (0.010) (0.197) 
Investment opportunities   -0.984 -5.262 *** -2.650** 
 (0.308) (0.000) (0.041) 
Size 0.743 ** 0.628 *** 1.420** 
 (0.048) (0.000) (0.038) 
Tenure 0.101 0.000 0.028 
 (0.463) (0.998) (0.903) 
Age 0.031 -0.029 -0.014 
 (0.615) (0.673) (0.894) 
Diversification  0.008 -0.086 -0.116 
 (0.971) (0.691) (0.763) 
    
Country Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
    
No. Observations 60 180 120 
    
Adjusted R²  0.336 0.352 0.248 
    
The results of two-stage regressions. The dependent variable is the bank’s default risk as measured by Merton distance 
to default. CDS-trading is the total notional amount of CDS held for trading scaled by total assets. CDS-trading (predicted) 
is endogenously determined by stock options’ vega and other variables. The first-stage regressions are not reported here 
for the sake of brevity. ***, ** and * show statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10 % levels, respectively. 
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Appendix A 
A summary of empirical studies on derivatives use and risk-taking incentives induced 
by stock option compensation 
 
Authors 
Sample (size & country) 
Relationship 
between stock 
options and 
derivatives use* 
Tufano (1996) 48 North American gold and mining firms Negative 
Géczy, Minton and Schrand 
(1997) 
372 US nonfinancial firms Positive 
Nam and Gay (1998) 325 US nonfinancial firms Positive 
Knopf, Nam and Thornton (2002) 260 US nonfinancial firms 
Negative 
Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) 117 US oil and gas firms 
Negative 
Rogers (2002) 569 US firms from various industries 
Negative 
Adkins, Carter and Simpson 
(2007) 
252 US financial firms (banks) Negative 
Ertugrul, Sezer and Sirmans 
(2008) 
112 US real estate investment trust firms Negative 
Supanvanij and Strauss (2010) 198 US nonfinancial firms 
Negative 
*Note: None of these studies examine the use of CDS. 
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Appendix B 
A summary of empirical studies on derivatives use and firm risk 
 
Authors Sample (size & country) 
Relationship 
between 
derivatives use 
and firm risk 
Guay (1999) 254 US nonfinancial firms Negative 
Allayannis and Ofek (2001) 378 US nonfinancial firms Negative 
Hentschel and Kothari (2001) 425 US firms from various 
industries 
Insignificant 
Faulkender (2005) 133 US chemical firms Positive 
Adam and Guettler (2010) 100 US mutual fund firms Positive 
Bartram, Brown and Conrad 
(2011) 
6,888 nonfinancial firms from 47 
countries 
Negative 
Nijskens and Wagner (2011) 38 financial firms from various 
countries (banks)  
Positive 
Fung, Wen and Zhang (2012) 191 US financial firms 
(insurance) 
Positive 
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Appendix C 
Calculating the risk-taking incentives of stock options (vega) 
The following equation is adopted from Core and Guay (2002): 
 
𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎 =  
𝜕𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
𝜕𝜎
 × 0.01
= 𝑒− 𝑑𝑇𝑁′  (𝑍)𝑆√𝑇 × 0.01 
 
 
  
 
Where 𝑍 =
ln(𝑆 𝑋⁄ ) + (𝑟𝑓 − 𝑑 + 0.5𝜎2)𝑇
𝜎√𝑇
  
 
N’      = 
 
normal density function 
S       = the price of the underlying stock at the valuation date 
X      = the exercise price of the option 
σ       = the expected stock return volatility 
rf       = the risk-free interest rate 
T       = time to expiration date 
d       = expected dividend yield over the life of the option 
 
Merton distance to default calculation 
DDt     = ln (VA;t/Lt)+(r-0.5σ²A;t)T 
 
 
σA;t√T 
σA, t         σE, tVE,t /(VE, t + Lt) 
VA, t  the market value of assets 
Lt  the book value of total liabilities 
r the risk-free rate 
σA, t  the annualised asset volatility at t 
T  the time to maturity 
σE the historical volatility of equity 
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APPENDIX D 
Variables and definitions  
Variable Definition  
 
Salary 
 
CEO’s annual base salary. 
 
Bonus CEO’s cash bonuses. 
 
Stock grants The value of stock grants held by the CEO at the end of year.  
 
CEO vega 
 
The pay-risk sensitivity: the change in the dollar value of CEO 
wealth for a 0.01 change in stock return volatility, measured by 
partial derivatives of the Black-Scholes value of options with respect 
to stock return volatility. 
 
Ownership The percentage of the bank’s ordinary shares owned by the CEO. 
 
Age The age of the bank’s CEO. 
Tenure The number of years the CEO has served the bank.   
CDS-trading The notional amount of CDS held for trading purposes. This is 
scaled by either total CDS held or total assets. 
 
CDS-hedging The notional amount of CDS held for hedging purposes. This is 
scaled by either total CDS held or total assets. 
 
Derivatives-hedging Total notional amount of derivative contracts for hedging purposes. 
 
Derivatives-trading Total notional amount of derivative contracts for trading purposes. 
 
Investment opportunities Market-to-book value of assets.  
 
Leverage Book value of debt/book value of total assets. 
 
Default risk The number of standard deviations that the market value of bank 
assets is above default point. Default is where the market value of 
assets is less than the book value of total liabilities. 
  
Size Total revenue. 
 
Diversification 
 
 
NPLs 
The number of geographical segments covered by a bank’s 
operation. 
 
 
Based on the ratios of non-performing loans for banks in each 
country (value equals 1 if the NPL ratio is lower than the average 
NPL ratio of European banks, and 0 otherwise). 
  
